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PROBABLE CAUSE TO PROTECT CHILDREN: 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CHILD 
MOLESTATION AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
NICHOLAS PISEGNA* 
Abstract: The federal Circuit Courts of Appeal are divided regarding whether 
probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provides probable 
cause to search for child pornography. This Note examines the relationship 
among the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, delves into the empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship between child pornography and child moles-
tation, and analyzes how the “flexible, non-technical” probable cause standard 
properly interacts with this relationship. In United States v. Colbert, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that, because of the “intuitive 
relationship” between child molestation and child pornography, a warrant to 
search for evidence of child pornography based solely on evidence of child mo-
lestation is supported by probable cause. This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit 
appropriately balances the elastic probable cause standard, the policy concerns 
related to crimes against children, and the nexus between child molestation and 
child pornography in concluding that probable cause to search for evidence of 
child molestation provides probable cause to search for child pornography. 
INTRODUCTION 
“It was the worst moment of my life,” seventeen-year-old Nicole said, re-
ferring to the moment she discovered that her father had distributed photo-
graphs and videos of his repeated sexual abuse of her, occurring when she was 
between nine and thirteen years old.1 Nicole’s father had started showing her 
child pornography when she was close to nine years old as a way to seduce her 
to engage in sexual acts with him.2 His abuse quickly escalated, as soon there-
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–
2016. 
 1 Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen Childhood, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html 
[http://perma.cc/2DK4-CVE5]. 
 2 Id. In Osborne v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court cited evidence presented by the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Commission on Pornography that indicates that pedophiles often use pornography to seduce 
their underage victims. See 495 U.S. 103, 111 n.7 (1990) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 649 (July 1986)) (noting that “a child 
who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photo-
graphs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children ‘having fun’ participating in such 
activity”). 
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after, Nicole’s father forced her to perform oral sex on him and raped her, 
sometimes binding her with ropes, all while recording the encounters and shar-
ing them with thousands of individuals on the Internet.3 At age sixteen, Nicole 
revealed the abuse to her mother, and Nicole’s father was arrested for child 
rape; however, law enforcement officials did not discover the pornographic 
photographs and videos of Nicole and her father until months after his initial 
arrest.4 At that point, Nicole’s father was out on bail and he fled the country as 
soon as it became apparent that law enforcement knew he was involved in the 
production and distribution of child pornography.5 
Unfortunately, Nicole’s story is far from unique, as child pornography 
victimizes, conservatively, thousands of children each year.6 Although esti-
mates vary regarding the extent of the child pornography industry because the 
crime is so difficult to track, the proliferation of child pornography as well as 
the prosecution of child pornography related crimes is considerable.7 In 1994, 
during the early days of the Internet, only sixty-one defendants were convicted 
in federal court for child pornography related offenses; in 2011, that number 
increased to 1880.8 Further, conservative estimates of the size of the child por-
nography market are daunting.9 In 2007, the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children reported that eight million images of child pornography are 
on the Internet, and a congressional investigation in 2008 estimated that num-
ber to be closer to three million images.10 
As Nicole’s case illustrates, child pornography and child sexual abuse are 
intricately related, but courts have struggled with how to handle the relation-
ship between the two.11 A recent report by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Bazelon, supra note 1. A commenter on one of the videos noted, “The fact remains that she is 
the most searched for, sought after and downloaded ever . . . . There are hours of video out there.” Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. Law enforcement officials captured and arrested Nicole’s father months later in Hong Kong. 
Id. Further, as of the date of publication of the New York Times article, Nicole has received more than 
$550,000 in restitution from 204 different men. Id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See IAN O’DONNELL & CLAIRE MILNER, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: CRIME, COMPUTERS & SOCI-
ETY 79 (2007) (“Attempts to tally the number of child pornography enthusiasts are as pointless as the 
guesstimates of the numbers of victims and images in circulation. The illegal nature of every aspect of 
this trade leaves few individuals willing to admit their involvement.”); Bazelon, supra note 1. 
 8 Bazelon, supra note 1. Quoting a 2010 Department of Justice report about the troubling breadth 
of child pornography, the article notes that “‘the market—in terms of numbers of offenders, images, 
and victims’—was growing to a degree described as ‘overwhelming’ and ‘exponential.’” Id. 
 9 See 154 CONG. REC. H10250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Barton); Julian Sher 
& Benedict Carey, Federal Study Stirs Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2007, at A20. 
 10 See 154 CONG. REC. H10250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Barton); Sher & 
Carey, supra note 9. The discrepancy is likely not the result of a decrease in the number of images on 
the Internet, but rather because of the difficulty of tracking child pornography. Bazelon, supra note 1. 
 11 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a search warrant invalid 
and implying an insufficient connection between child molestation and child pornography because, 
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Criminal Division, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section noted that child 
pornography requires child sexual abuse, concluding, “[I]t is simply not possi-
ble to disconnect the collection, trade, viewing, and possession of these images 
[of child pornography] from their production.”12 Despite the Department of 
Justice’s opinion that child molestation and child pornography are unquestion-
ably related, however, courts have come to differing conclusions regarding 
how the relationship between child pornography and child sexual abuse im-
pacts offenders and the prosecution of offenders.13 
This Note analyzes how courts address the connection between child por-
nography and child sexual abuse in the context of probable cause, examining, 
in particular, whether probable cause to search for evidence of child sexual 
abuse automatically creates probable cause to search for evidence of child por-
nography. Part I details the probable cause standard, the history of the crimi-
nalization of child pornography in the United States, and the current split 
among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding whether evidence of child 
molestation is sufficient to provide probable cause to search for evidence of 
child pornography. Part II examines the bases for the differing circuit court 
decisions, including the lack of consensus among empirical studies on the sub-
ject and the policy considerations that inform the probable cause inquiry. Fi-
nally, Part III argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
properly concludes that evidence of child molestation does provide probable 
cause to search for evidence of child pornography because of the common 
sense, non-technical nature of the probable cause standard, the sufficient em-
pirical support for the connection, and the policy concerns related to child mo-
lestation and child pornography. Should courts decline to adopt this standard, 
Part III explains, the good faith exception should undoubtedly apply to evi-
                                                                                                                           
although the warrant established probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation, it failed to 
establish probable cause to search for child pornography). But see, e.g., U.S. v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 
578–79 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a search warrant for child pornography was valid based largely 
on evidence of child molestation because “there is an intuitive relationship between acts such as child 
molestation or enticement and possession of child pornography”). 
 12 ALEXANDRA GELBER, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RESPONSE TO “A RELUCTANT 
REBELLION” 4 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/downloads/ReluctantRebellionResponse.
pdf [http://perma.cc/D5HK-266W]. The report cites a study that found a strong correlation between 
individuals who possess or traffic child pornography and individuals who have committed contact 
offenses against children. See id. at 6 (citing Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The “Butner 
Study” Redux: A Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography 
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 183–91 (2009)). 
 13 Compare Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292 (finding a search warrant invalid and implying an insuffi-
cient connection between child molestation and child pornography because, although the warrant 
established probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation, it failed to establish probable 
cause to search for child pornography), with Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79 (finding a search warrant for 
child pornography valid based largely on evidence of child molestation because “there is an intuitive 
relationship between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of child pornogra-
phy”). 
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dence seized pursuant to search warrants to search for child pornography that 
are solely based on evidence of child molestation. 
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE STANDARDS 
OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SEARCH FOR IT 
The differing interpretations of probable cause in federal circuit court cases 
involving both child molestation and child pornography is a product of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s fluid “totality-of-the-circumstances” probable cause standard.14 
Courts treat “probable cause” as the measure of justification under the U.S. Con-
stitution and the Fourth Amendment for a search, seizure, or arrest.15 Although 
the Supreme Court has noted that probable cause is “incapable of precise defini-
tion or quantification,” the Court has held that probable cause exists when, given 
the totality of the circumstances facing the officers or made apparent in an affi-
davit for a search or arrest warrant, “there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”16 
The discord among the Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the relation-
ship between child molestation and child pornography is also a result of the 
relatively recent criminalization of child pornography—first criminalized in 
1977—and the resulting policy concerns.17 Because the probable cause inquiry 
is a “fluid concept . . . [that is] not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 
set of legal rules,” and because of the equally uncertain causal relationship be-
tween child molestation and child pornography, federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have come to different conclusions regarding whether probable cause to 
search for evidence of child sexual abuse automatically creates probable cause 
to search for evidence of child pornography.18 
A. The Case-by-Case Nature of Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for the protec-
tion of citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, guaranteeing: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983). 
 15 See id. at 236–38. 
 16 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 17 See Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A 
(2012); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
 18 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232; see Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 2011); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 579; United States v. 
Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008); Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292. 
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ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.19 
Accordingly, in order for a search warrant to be valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, it must (1) be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate,20 (2) 
present to the magistrate an adequate showing of probable cause,21 and (3) de-
scribe with particularity the place to be searched and the items or persons to be 
seized.22 Although some dispute exists with regard to the relationship between 
the two opening clauses in the Fourth Amendment and whether a search with-
out a warrant is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,23 
the Supreme Court has held that, in cases involving a search warrant, searches 
and seizures “are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by probable cause.”24 
In Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court held that magistrates should con-
sider the “totality of the circumstances” when assessing whether there is prob-
able cause to justify granting a search warrant.25 The inquiry into the totality of 
                                                                                                                           
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) ( “[The Fourth Amendment’s] protec-
tion consists of requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). 
 21 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. 
 22 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment addresses 
the problem of excessive searches “by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized”) 
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). 
 23 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The two clauses in dispute are the “Reasonableness Clause,” which 
guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” and the “Warrants Clause,” which requires that 
“no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.” Id. One understanding of the relationship between 
the two clauses is that the Warrants Clause “gives content to the word ‘unreasonable’ in the [Reasona-
bleness Clause].” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)). Under this interpretation, searches conducted 
without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate—that is, searches without a warrant—are presump-
tively unreasonable, subject to a few exceptions. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). The other possible interpretation of the relationship 
between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment is that the two clauses should be read separately, 
and therefore the reasonableness of a search does not depend on whether law enforcement officials 
obtained a warrant. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950). Under this school of thought, a court, in 
determining whether the search violated Fourth Amendment interests, should examine the contextual 
circumstances that justified the search rather than strictly consider whether law enforcement officials 
obtained a search warrant prior to the search. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65–66. 
 24 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214). 
 25 Gates, 462 U.S. at 214. The Court in Gates modified the “rigid” two-pronged test that courts 
had been applying to assess probable cause. See id.; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418–19 
(1969), abrogated by Gates, 462 U.S. at 214; Aguilar v. Tex., 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), abrogated by 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 214. Prior to Gates, the Court applied the rigid two-pronged Aguillar-Spinelli test 
to situations in which the affidavit that supported a search warrant was based on hearsay information. 
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 214. Discussing the Aguillar-Spinelli test, the majority in Gates reasoned that, 
although an inquiry into the basis of knowledge and veracity of the source of information that informs 
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the circumstances requires judges and magistrates to make “a practical, com-
mon-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affi-
davit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place.”26 In order to make the “common-sense” deter-
mination regarding probable cause, courts should weigh the evidence present-
ed “not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement.”27 Under this standard, the judge or 
magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the materials given in support 
of a warrant.28 The probable cause standard under Gates is thus a “fluid con-
cept,” and as a result has led to conflicting decisions in lower courts applying 
the standard.29 
B. The Criminalization of Child Pornography 
The criminalization of child pornography is a relatively recent develop-
ment in the nation’s legal system as Congress first criminalized child pornog-
raphy in the late 1970s.30 In response to growing societal outrage over the pro-
liferation of child pornography and the lack of federal regulation of the crime, 
Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 
1977 (“PCASE”).31 Borrowing from Supreme Court precedent approving the 
criminalization of “obscene materials,” PCASE prohibited the creation or dis-
tribution of obscene material involving individuals younger than sixteen years 
old.32 
                                                                                                                           
probable cause is critical, “these elements should [not] be understood as entirely separate and inde-
pendent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.” Id. at 230. Instead, the Gates majority held 
that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 214. 
 26 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27 Id. at 231–32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 441, 418 (1981)). 
 28 Id. at 240. 
 29 Id. at 232. Compare United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable cause to search 
for child pornography), and Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 422 (3d Cir. 2011) (coming to the 
same conclusion as the court in Doyle), and United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(coming to the same conclusion as the court in Doyle), and United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 
286 (6th Cir. 2008) (coming to the same conclusion as the court in Doyle), with U.S. v. Colbert, 605 
F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that probable cause to search for evidence of child molesta-
tion does provide probable cause to search for child pornography). 
 30 Emily Weissler, Head Versus Heart: Applying Empirical Evidence About the Connection Be-
tween Child Pornography and Child Molestation to Probable Cause Analyses, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1487, 1492 (2013). Weissler details the United States’ early history of apathy toward child pornogra-
phy and notes that, until the late 1970s, magazines and pictures containing child pornography were 
openly distributed. See id. 
 31 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). 
 32 Id.; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (noting the “inherent dangers of under-
taking to regulate any form of expression,” but upholding the regulation of items that “appeal to the 
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as 
a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
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In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of child 
pornography for the first time and concluded that child pornography is not en-
titled to First Amendment protection.33 The Court reasoned that the govern-
ment interest in preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, an 
interest of “surpassing importance,” outweighed First Amendment considera-
tions.34 The Court considered child pornography so “abhorrent” that it did not 
fall under the reach of the First Amendment because child pornography “is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.”35 
Following the enactment of PCASE and the decision in Ferber, Congress 
passed a series of legislation that provided for increased protection of children 
against the harms of child pornography.36 The Child Protection Act of 1984 
expanded PCASE, changing the definition of child pornography from its prior 
focus on “obscene materials” involving children to any materials that depicted 
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and also increasing the age of 
maturity from sixteen to eighteen.37 In 1988, Congress passed the Child Pro-
tection and Obscenity Enforcement Act (CPOEA), which criminalized the dis-
tribution of child pornography using a computer in response to technological 
advances that enabled the proliferation of illegal child pornography.38 Finally, 
in 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act (“PROTECT”) further expanded the criminalization of 
child pornography, making it illegal to solicit child pornography.39 Under 
PROTECT, any solicitation of child pornography is prohibited regardless of 
whether there is actual child pornography involved, so long as a party to the 
exchange believes that child pornography is involved.40 As a result of the rapid 
expansion of the criminalization of child pornography, borne from a concern 
for the protection of children from sexual abuse and the difficulty in stopping 
the spread of child pornography due to technology, sentences for offenders 
have increased in severity.41 
                                                                                                                           
 33 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). 
 34 Id. at 757. 
 35 Id. at 757 n.8. 
 36 See Weissler, supra note 30, at 1494–95. 
 37 Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012)). 
 38 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012)); 
see Weissler, supra note 30, at 1494. 
 39 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 40 See Weissler, supra note 30, at 1495. 
 41 See Wilber A. Barillas, “The Marvels of Modern Technology”: Constitutional Rights, Technol-
ogy, and Statutory Interpretation Collide in United States v. Chiaradio, 33 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 7 
n.49 (2013) (citing the title of a recent amendment to a law against child pornography, titled “Zero 
Tolerance for Possession of Child Pornography,” as an indication of Congress’s relatively recent in-
tention of harshly punishing offenders); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography 
from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 857 (2011) (detailing the drastic increase in sentenc-
ing for defendants convicted of dealing in child pornography); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
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C. The Circuit Split Over the Automatic Right to Search for Evidence of 
Child Pornography Based on Child Molestation 
Following the introduction of the fluid and imprecise totality of the cir-
cumstances standard for probable cause in Gates and the rapid criminalization 
of child pornography, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have struggled to 
come to a consensus regarding whether probable cause to search for evidence 
of child molestation automatically provides probable cause to search for child 
pornography.42 The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Sixth Circuits have held that probable cause to search for evidence of child 
molestation does not provide probable cause to search for child pornography.43 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, although proba-
ble cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable 
cause to search for child pornography, an objectively reasonable officer could 
believe that such a relationship provides probable cause; therefore the good 
faith exception should apply to evidence seized pursuant to warrants to search 
for child pornography based on evidence of child molestation.44 Finally, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that probable cause to 
search for evidence of child molestation does provide probable cause to search 
for evidence of child pornography.45 
1. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits: No Relationship 
The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have each held that proba-
ble cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable 
cause to search for evidence of child pornography, and further, that the good 
faith exception does not apply to evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant 
when it is based solely on such a relationship.46 
                                                                                                                           
default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-
pornography-offenses/Executive_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q69J-QMFY] (detailing increases in 
child pornography sentences and the considerable rise of the minimum sentencing guidelines for child 
pornography crimes). 
 42 See, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 286 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
 43 See Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 422 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 
460, 463 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008); Hodson, 543 F.3d 
at 286. 
 44 See United States v. Needham, 718 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013); Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 
899–900; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (explaining the good faith exception: if an 
objectively reasonable officer would conclude that a search warrant, later found by the court to be insuf-
ficient, was valid, then evidence obtained as a result of the lacking warrant should not be suppressed). 
 45 See Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79. 
 46 See John, 654 F.3d at 422; Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463; Falso, 544 F.3d at 112–13; Hodson, 543 
F.3d at 286. 
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a. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Hodson 
In United States v. Hodson, the Sixth Circuit became the first among these 
four federal Circuit Courts of Appeal to consider this issue.47 In Hodson, law 
enforcement officials caught the defendant—a forty-one-year-old married man 
with two sons—attempting to arrange sexual acts with what he believed to be a 
twelve-year-old boy online.48 As a result of their investigations into the de-
fendant’s attempts to commit child molestation, law enforcement officers pre-
pared a search warrant for the defendant’s residence to search solely for evi-
dence of or related to child pornography, and not for evidence of or related to 
child molestation.49 A magistrate judge issued the warrant and detectives re-
covered numerous pieces of evidence of child pornography in the defendant’s 
home.50 
The Sixth Circuit held that the evidence recovered in the defendant’s 
home should have been suppressed because the warrant failed to establish a 
nexus between child molestation and child pornography that would establish 
probable cause to support a search warrant for child pornography.51 The unan-
imous panel decision stressed that, although the law enforcement officials es-
tablished probable cause for the crime of child molestation, they requested a 
search warrant for evidence related to an “entirely different crime (child por-
nography).”52 In support of its decision, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 
nexus between the crime of child molestation and child pornography is “lim-
ited,” “indirect,” and “weak,” and that such a link would depend on empirical 
evidence that the law enforcement officials did not provide in their search war-
rant.53 Further, the court added that even a “reasonably well trained officer,” let 
                                                                                                                           
 47 543 F.3d at 286; see John, 654 F.3d at 422; Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463; Falso, 544 F.3d at 112–13. 
 48 543 F.3d at 287. The detective pretended to be a twelve-year-old boy on the Internet while 
interacting with the defendant. Id. 
 49 Id. at 287–89. 
 50 Id. at 289. 
 51 Id. at 286, 292. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the search warrant was not 
supported by probable cause and reversed the lower court’s ruling that the search warrant was still valid 
as a result of the good faith exception to the search warrant requirement. See id. at 292–93. When the 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence recovered in his home because the search warrant contained 
various deficiencies related to the probable cause supporting the search warrant, the magistrate judge had 
found that, although the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the search was nonetheless 
valid under the good faith exception because the omission of a connection between child pornography 
and child molestation in the warrant was an innocent oversight not made in bad faith or calculated to 
mislead the magistrate. See id. at 289–91; Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23. The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky had affirmed the ruling of the magistrate judge, holding that, although the 
search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the good faith exception applied and, as a result, the 
defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. See Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291–92. 
 52 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292. 
 53 Id. at 290–91. 
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alone a neutral and detached magistrate, would have realized that the search 
described did not match the probable cause described.54 
b. The Second Circuit: United States v. Falso 
Soon after Hodson was decided, the Second Circuit echoed the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Falso, similarly concluding that probable cause to 
search for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable cause to 
search for evidence of child pornography.55 In Falso, the defendant was under 
investigation for appearing to gain access to a child pornography website.56 
Law enforcement officials supported the search warrant with evidence of their 
investigation into the defendant’s online habits, using information gathered by 
a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Behavioral Analysis Unit 
that supported a connection between child molestation and child pornogra-
phy.57 The officials also cited evidence that the defendant was convicted of 
sexually abusing a seven-year-old girl approximately eighteen years prior to 
the application for the search warrant.58 A magistrate judge issued the warrant 
and the search of the defendant’s residence revealed a collection of child por-
nography; the defendant subsequently admitted to possessing the child pornog-
raphy, partaking in sexual activity with girls in other countries whom he be-
lieved to be under the age of eighteen, and to a prior conviction of sexually 
abusing a seven-year-old girl.59 The district court denied the defendant’s mo-
tion to suppress and found that the search warrant was supported by probable 
cause because of the “proclivity of [child molesters] to . . . maintain images of 
child pornography,” as well as the Behavioral Analysis Unit’s submitted evi-
dence connecting the two crimes.60 
The Second Circuit majority reversed the district court’s finding that the 
warrant to search for child pornography was supported by probable cause, in 
part because “[the defendant’s] crime allegedly involv[ing] the sexual abuse of 
a minor . . . did not relate to child pornography.”61 The majority reasoned that 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See id. at 292–93. The court employed this reasoning to support the reversal of the lower 
court’s decision that the search warrant and execution of the search warrant fell under the good faith 
exception. Id. 
 55 See Falso, 544 F.3d at 113; Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292–93. 
 56 Falso, 544 F.3d at 112. The defendant was under investigation for appearing to gain access to a 
child pornography website as opposed to actually accessing the website because the investigators 
could not prove that he had, in fact, accessed the website. Id. at 113–14. Instead, the investigators 
relied heavily on the fact that they found the defendant’s name on an email list that the website sent to 
subscribers. Id. 
 57 Id. at 112–14. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 114. 
 60 See id. at 113, 116. 
 61 See id. at 123, 124. The majority also cited other excessive inferential leaps in the search war-
rant that precluded a finding of probable cause, including that the search warrant provided insufficient 
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“[a]lthough offenses relating to child pornography and sexual abuse of minors 
both involve the exploitation of children, that does not compel, or even sug-
gest, the correlation drawn by the district court” that evidence of child molesta-
tion provides probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography.62 
Although commending the lower court’s admirable concern for public safety, 
the majority concluded that an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights “cannot 
be vitiated based on fallacious inferences drawn from facts not supported by 
the affidavit.”63 
c. The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Doyle 
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Doyle joined the Second 
and Sixth Circuits in holding that probable cause to search for evidence of 
child molestation does not provide probable cause to search for evidence of 
child pornography.64 In United States v. Doyle, law enforcement officials based 
a search warrant for child pornography on the accounts of three children who 
alleged that the defendant had molested them.65 The execution of the search 
warrant led to the discovery of child pornography in the defendant’s home in 
Lee County, Virginia.66 Citing Hodson and Falso, the Fourth Circuit found that 
the warrant to search for evidence of child pornography lacked probable cause 
because the support for the warrant related almost entirely to child molestation 
and not child pornography.67 The majority noted that, because Virginia has dis-
tinct laws addressing each offense, the search warrant insufficiently linked the 
child molestation of which the defendant was accused to the evidence of child 
pornography for which law enforcement officials sought to search.68 Similar to 
the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit declined to apply the good faith exception, 
                                                                                                                           
evidence that the defendant in fact accessed or attempted to access a pornographic website. See id. at 
124. 
 62 Id. at 122. The majority added, “It is an inferential fallacy of ancient standing to conclude that, 
because members of group A (those who collect child pornography) are likely to be members of group 
B (those attracted to children), then group B is entirely or even largely composed of, members of 
group A . . . . That the law criminalizes both child pornography and the sexual abuse (or endanger-
ment) of children cannot be enough.” Id. at 122–23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 82 (2005) (Pooler, J., dissenting)). 
 63 Id. at 122. The majority ultimately upheld the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
suppress based on the good faith exception in relation to the email list. Id. at 129. The court noted, 
inter alia, that the search warrant contained evidence that directly tied the defendant to child pornography 
websites, including the fact that the defendant’s e-mail address appeared on the mailing list of a child 
pornography website. See id. at 114, 128–29. 
 64 See United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 2011); Falso, 544 F.3d at 113; United 
States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 286 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 65 See Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463–66. 
 66 Id. at 463. 
 67 Id. at 472 (citing Falso, 544 F.3d at 124; Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292). 
 68 See id. at 471. The majority also expressed doubt regarding the veracity and accuracy of the 
victims’ accounts that supported the search warrant. See id. at 471–72. 
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concluding that the lack of a nexus between child molestation and child por-
nography is so clear that even a “reasonable law enforcement officer” would 
have known that the search warrant in this case—a search warrant for child 
pornography based almost entirely on evidence of child molestation—was not 
supported by probable cause.69 
d. The Third Circuit: Virgin Islands v. John 
The Third Circuit is the most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to review at 
length, for the first time, the relationship between probable cause to search for 
evidence of child molestation and probable cause to search for evidence of 
child pornography.70 In Virgin Islands v. John, the Third Circuit concluded, as 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits had, that not only is a warrant to search for child 
pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation not supported by 
probable cause, but also that the relationship between the two offenses is so 
distant that evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant should not be admitted 
based on the good faith exception.71 The Third Circuit held that the affidavit in 
question did not provide any support for the connection between child molesta-
tion and child pornography.72 The Third Circuit relied heavily on the reasoning 
of the Second and Sixth Circuits, which reached the same conclusion, quoting 
language from the two that finding probable cause based on the relationship 
would be “an inferential fallacy,”73 and that, because finding such a relation-
ship is “entirely unreasonable,” the good faith exception should not apply.74 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. at 473–74; see Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292–93. 
 70 See John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011); Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463; Falso, 544 F.3d at 112–13; 
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 286. 
 71 See John, 654 F.3d at 422; see also Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463 (holding that a warrant to search for 
child pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation is not supported by probable cause, nor 
is evidence seized based on a faulty warrant eligible for the good faith exception); Hodson, 543 F.3d at 
286 (coming to the same conclusion as in Doyle). In John, the warrant to search for child pornography 
was solely supported by allegations that the defendant sexually assaulted several children at the school 
where he taught and recorded sexually explicit material about a number of his students in notebooks 
that he brought with him to school every day. See John, 654 F.3d at 413–14. 
 72 John, 654 F.3d at 419. The majority read the affidavit very narrowly, construing language in 
the affidavit that said that “persons who commit sexual offense crimes involving children customarily 
hide evidence of such offenses, including notes, photographs, [and] computer files, in their homes and 
on their computer[s],” to mean that the affiant-officer alleged that a defendant who has been accused 
of sexually abusing children “‘customarily hide[s]’ evidence of that crime in his home and/or on his 
computer,” and not to allege that the defendant also “‘customarily hide[s]’ evidence of other crimes in 
his home or anywhere else.” Id. 
 73 Id. (quoting Falso, 544 F.3d at 122). 
 74 Id. at 418. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit: The Good Faith Exception 
Although the Ninth Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule in accordance 
with the aforementioned Circuit Courts of Appeal that probable cause to search 
for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable cause to search for 
evidence of child pornography, the Ninth Circuit stands in contrast to those 
other Circuit Courts of Appeal because it applies the good faith exception in 
cases involving search warrants for child pornography that are based solely on 
evidence of child molestation.75 In United States v. Needham, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the search warrant in question was not supported by probable cause, 
but because it was “executed in objectively reasonable reliance on the search 
warrant [that had been issued by a neutral magistrate],” the good faith excep-
tion applied and, therefore, the evidence seized from the defendant’s apartment 
should not be suppressed.76 With regard to probable cause, the majority con-
cluded, “It is clear in this circuit that [the inference that those who molest chil-
dren are likely to possess pornography], alone, does not establish probable 
cause to search a suspected child molester’s home for child pornography.”77 
Nonetheless, the majority refused to suppress the evidence seized as a result of 
the faulty search warrant because it had recently ruled in Dougherty v. City of 
Covina that the good faith exception should apply in cases in which a search 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Compare United States v. Needham, 718 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2013), with Doyle, 650 
F.3d at 472 (holding that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide 
probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography), and Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292. Needham 
appears to have strictly interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dougherty and upheld a bright-line 
test in these type of cases. See Needham, 718 F.3d at 1195–96; Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899–900. In 
Dougherty, the Ninth Circuit appeared to uphold a totality of the circumstances test instead of a 
bright-line rule in a case involving a search warrant for child pornography based solely on evidence of 
child molestation. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899. Police officers applied for a search warrant for the 
defendant’s home, computer, and electronic media for child pornography based on: (1) a three-year-
old allegation from a sixth grade student that the defendant had molested her; (2) subsequent allega-
tions from other students alleging similar conduct; and (3) the investigating officer’s fourteen years of 
experience on the police force and extensive training involving juvenile and sex crimes. Id. at 896. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the search warrant in question was not supported by probable cause, but sug-
gested that the totality of the circumstances test for probable cause to search for evidence of child moles-
tation could provide probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography. Id. at 899. Although this 
suggestion has since been rebutted by United States v. Needham, the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply 
the good faith exception to cases in which a warrant to search a defendant’s house was supported solely 
by evidence of child molestation and was issued by a neutral magistrate. See Needham, 718 F.3d at 
1195–96; Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899. 
 76 Needham, 718 F.3d at 1195. The search warrant in Needham to search, inter alia, the defend-
ant’s home for evidence of child pornography was supported by the following evidence: (1) an allega-
tion from the mother of a five-year-old that the defendant had molested the child in the restroom at a 
local mall; (2) the defendant had been arrested for sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen; 
and (3) the investigating officer claimed that “based on [the officer’s] training and experience,” the 
defendant’s history of child molestation strongly suggested that the defendant was involved with child 
pornography. See id. at 1191–93. 
 77 Id. at 1195. 
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warrant relies on the connection between child molestation and child pornog-
raphy.78 The majority in Needham explained that, because the majority in 
Dougherty granted the officers in that case qualified immunity, and “because 
the standard for granting qualified immunity is the same as the standard of ob-
jective reasonableness under [United States v.] Leon,” Ninth Circuit precedent 
demands that evidence seized pursuant to an issued search warrant in cases 
involving a warrant to search for evidence of child pornography based solely 
on evidence of child molestation falls under the good faith exception and, 
therefore, should not be excluded.79 
The majority in Needham relied on United States v. Leon in applying the 
good faith exception to warrants to search for child pornography that are based 
on evidence of child molestation.80 In United States v. Leon, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the exclusionary rule barring illegally obtained evidence from 
the courtroom does not apply to evidence seized “in objectively reasonable 
reliance on” a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate judge, even 
where the warrant is subsequently deemed invalid.81 The good faith exception 
applies as long as the issuing judge has not been knowingly misled or has not 
wholly abandoned his or her role as a neutral and detached magistrate, the ap-
plication is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance 
upon it unreasonable, or the warrant is not so facially deficient that reliance 
upon it is unreasonable.82 In providing such a considerable exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the majority in Leon reasoned that “even assuming that the 
[exclusionary] rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 1195–96; Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. 
 79 Needham, 718 F.3d at 1195; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). The Supreme 
Court has explained that the doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 
1244 (2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Therefore, the determination 
regarding whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity generally depends on the “objective 
legal reasonableness” of the action. Id. at 1245. The Court also noted that the standard for the good 
faith exception is the same as this standard for granting qualified immunity. See id. at 1245 n.1; Mal-
ley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986) (citation omitted) (“Only where the warrant application is 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the 
shield of immunity be lost.”). 
 80 See Needham, 718 F.3d at 1194–95; Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
 81 468 U.S. at 922. 
 82 See id. at 922–23; see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 551 (2004) (holding the good faith 
exception not applicable where a search warrant did not describe the things to be seized, and therefore 
was so facially invalid that reliance on it could not be found to be reasonable); Lo-Ji Sales v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 319, 320 (1979) (holding that the good faith exception was not applicable where a 
magistrate participated in execution of the search warrant and filled out sections of the warrant as he 
helped to conduct the search); United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 476 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the good faith exception was not applicable where the search warrant was so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause that no objectively reasonable officer would rely on the warrant); United States v. 
Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293–94 (6th Cir. 2008) (coming to the same conclusion as in Doyle). 
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incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in 
accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be 
applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.”83 
3. The Eighth Circuit: An “Intuitive Relationship” 
In United States v. Colbert, the Eighth Circuit became the first circuit 
court to hold that a search warrant for child pornography that was solely based 
on evidence that the defendant sought to commit or had committed child mo-
lestation was supported by probable cause.84 The majority reasoned that, be-
cause of the “intuitive relationship” between child molestation and child por-
nography, probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provides 
probable cause to search for child pornography.85 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of suppression of ev-
idence based on the malleable standard for probable cause as well as the clear 
connection between child molestation and child pornography.86 The court root-
ed its reasoning in the Supreme Court’s standard that probable cause is a “fluid 
concept” that requires judges and magistrates to conduct a “commonsense 
analysis of the facts available” to determine whether probable cause exists.87 
According to the majority, this inquiry should weigh evidence “not in terms of 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Leon, 468 U.S. at 918–19. In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court elaborated on the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule and when it is and is not applicable, noting that “[t]o trigger the ex-
clusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, 
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” 555 U.S. 
135, 141, 144 (2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909) (adding that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation,” 
and that the exclusionary rule “is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appre-
ciable deterrence’”); see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (explaining that suppression 
of evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse”). 
Therefore, when a reasonable officer would not know that his or her conduct was unconstitutional, he 
or she likely would not be discouraged by the knowledge that the evidence seized as a result of his or 
her actions would be suppressed, and therefore the exclusionary rule should not apply. See Herring, 
555 U.S. 144. 
 84 United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2010). The police sought a warrant to 
search the defendant’s home for child pornography after being informed of the defendant’s attempts to 
lure a five-year-old girl at a public playground to his apartment; they subsequently found materials 
that could be used to entice or force young children to go to the defendant’s apartment. Id. at 575–76. 
The search warrant included the fact that the defendant made comments to the five-year-old girl re-
garding videos that they should watch together, but the defendant never mentioned that those videos 
were pornographic. Id. The police officers involved in the investigation testified at the suppression 
hearing about their experience with, and knowledge regarding, the link between child molestation and 
child pornography, but did not include that information in the search warrant. Id. at 579. 
 85 Id. at 578; see also United States v. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063–64 (D.S.D. 2010) 
(citing Colbert, 605 F.2d at 578) (upholding a search warrant for child pornography based on the 
defendant admitting to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor because “there is an intuitive relation-
ship between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of child pornography”). 
 86 See Colbert, 605 F.3d at 576–78. 
 87 Id. at 576 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). 
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library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of 
law enforcement.”88 Here, the court found that the search warrant set forth am-
ple facts regarding the defendant’s desire to lure a five-year-old girl to his 
apartment.89 Despite acknowledging the holdings of other circuits—that such 
facts only provide probable cause to search for child molestation—the majority 
held that the search warrant in the case, to search for child pornography, was 
supported by probable cause because of the “intuitive relationship” between 
child molestation and child pornography.90 
The Eighth Circuit based its holding on common sense and precedent 
from the federal circuit and Supreme Court that posits a connection between 
child molestation and child pornography.91 Although the warrant provided no 
evidence of a connection between child molestation and child pornography, the 
majority held that the relationship between the two crimes is so intuitive that, 
based on a common-sense, non-technical approach to analyzing probable 
cause, the probable cause in the warrant to search for evidence of child moles-
tation also provided probable cause to search for evidence of child pornogra-
phy.92 In support of this connection, the Eighth Circuit cited its own precedent, 
as well as authority from the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court, that has 
suggested such an intuitive relationship.93 
II. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CHILD MOLESTATION AND CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY 
The inconsistency regarding whether probable cause to search for evi-
dence of child molestation provides probable cause to search for child pornog-
raphy is a result of each court’s struggle to balance the uncertainty and policy 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 578 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). 
 89 Id. at 575–77. 
 90 See id. at 577–78 (distinguishing Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292; Falso, 544 F.3d at 123). Chiding the 
other circuits’ strict interpretation of the probable cause standard, the majority concluded that those cir-
cuits’ “categorical distinction between possession of child pornography and other types of sexual exploi-
tation . . . seems to be in tension both with common experience and a fluid, non-technical conception of 
probable cause.” Id. at 578. 
 91 See id. at 576, 578–79; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 102, 111 (1990) (“[E]vidence sug-
gests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”); United 
States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (endorsing an officer’s statement that “computers 
and the Internet have become a common tool for individuals who get sexual gratification from view-
ing images of children or interacting with minors,” and that officers expect to find materials related to 
child pornography in the homes of such individuals); United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (“[C]ommon sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested in children is 
likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to order and receive child pornography.”). 
 92 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79. 
 93 See id. at 578 (reasoning that individuals seeking to entice and molest children may use child 
pornography to tempt children into engaging in sexual acts with them, and also may use child pornog-
raphy as a “simpler and less detectable way of satisfying pedophilic desires”) (citing Osborne, 495 
U.S. at 111; Byrd, 31 F.3d at 1339). 
2016] The Connection Between Child Molestation and Child Pornography 303 
concerns surrounding the connection between child molestation and child por-
nography.94 The scientific community, for instance, is divided on the issue, 
with some studies finding a discernable connection between the two crimes 
and others denying any useful connection.95 Further complicating the issue, 
considerable policy concerns surround both the treatment of child molestation 
and child pornography at the judicial and legislative levels.96 
A. Scientific Studies Analyzing the Connection Between Child  
Molestation and Child Pornography 
Although a large number of academic and government-sponsored social 
science studies have examined the purported connection between child moles-
tation and child pornography, the studies provide no consensus regarding a 
connection between the two crimes, and therefore provide minimal assistance 
to courts confronted with cases involving warrants dependent on such a rela-
tionship.97 In addition to the lack of consensus, scientific studies also signifi-
                                                                                                                           
 94 Compare Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578 (holding that probable cause to search for evidence of child 
molestation provides probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography), with Doyle, 650 
F.3d at 472 (holding that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide 
probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography). 
 95 Compare Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The “Butner Study” Redux: A Report of 
the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 FAM. VIOLENCE 
183, 183 (2009) [hereinafter Butner Study Redux] (finding that a considerable majority of convicted 
possessors of child pornography consulted for the study—self reporting inmates in prison for pos-
sessing child pornography—had also committed child molestation), and JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NA-
TIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 16 (2005), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/jvq/
CV81.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PR3-BHMS] [hereinafter WOLAK I] (finding that the majority of individ-
uals examined in the survey of arrests for Internet-related sex crimes committed against minors had 
either committed child molestation or had attempted to solicit undercover investigators posing online 
as minors), with Angela W. Eke et al., Examining the Criminal History and Future Offending of Child 
Pornography Offenders: An Extended Prospective Follow-up Study, 35 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 466, 476 
(2011) (arguing that not all child pornography offenders have a high risk of committing offenses in-
volving the sexual molestation of minors). 
 96 See Weissler, supra note 30, at 1498–1501 (highlighting the recent “extremely aggressive” 
efforts made in the United States to combat child pornography and punish offenders); Hessick, supra 
note 41, at 857 (highlighting the sentencing increases in the United States for child pornography of-
fenders). 
 97 See, e.g., Janis Wolak et al., Child Pornography Possessors: Trends in Offender and Case 
Characteristics, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 22 (2011) [hereinafter Wolak II]; Michael Seto et al., Contact Sex 
Offending by Men with Online Sexual Offenses, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 124 (2011); see also United States 
v. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (D.S.D. 2010) (appealing for additional research in ruling that 
such an “intuitive connection” exists between child molestation and child pornography to support a 
search warrant for child pornography based on evidence of attempted child molestation). See general-
ly U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 
170–74 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 SENTENCING REPORT] (summarizing existing research that examines 
the connection between child molestation and child pornography). 
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cantly vary with regard to their methodologies,98 sample sizes,99 and defini-
tions of key terms.100 The differing results of the studies support a wide range 
of conclusions regarding the connection between child molestation and child 
pornography.101 
1. A Strong Connection: The Butner Study Redux 
A 2009 study conducted by researchers Michael Bourke and Andres Her-
nandez, The Butner Study Redux, has been widely and controversially cited as 
the strongest evidence of a connection between child molestation and child 
pornography.102 Bourke and Hernandez conducted the study of 155 convicted 
child pornography offenders in the residential sexual offender treatment pro-
gram at the Butner Federal Prison in North Carolina and found that, based on 
participants’ self-reporting, a vast majority of the convicted child pornography 
offenders had committed at least one hands-on molestation offense.103 The 
study depended on the voluntary participation and self-reporting of the sub-
                                                                                                                           
 98 Compare Eke et al., supra note 95, at 467 (consulting data regarding convicted child pornogra-
phy offenders from official databases such as the Ontario Sex Offender Registry), with Butner Study 
Redux, supra note 95, at 185 (consulting official data regarding prior convictions, information in 
presentencing reports, as well as self-admissions made by the subjects of the study). 
 99 Compare Butner Study Redux, supra note 95, at 185 (sample of 155 federal child pornography 
offenders), with Wolak II, supra note 97, at 25 (sample of survey of over 2500 law enforcement agen-
cies). 
 100 Compare Wolak II, supra note 97, at 27 (defining “prior sexual misconduct against minors” to 
include offenses against minor victims as well as against undercover officers posing as minors), with 
Seto et al., supra note 97, at 132 (defining “prior sexual misconduct against minors” to include minor 
and adult victims, although noting that most of the victims were minors). 
 101 See Butner Study Redux, supra note 95, at 188 (asserting a strong connection between child 
molestation and child pornography—eighty-five percent of study participants convicted of possessing 
child pornography had committed prior “hands-on” offenses); Jerome Endrass et al., The Consumption 
of Internet Child Pornography and Violent and Sex Offending, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY 1, 4 (2009) (pur-
porting a minimal connection between the two offenses—4.8 percent of study participants had committed 
both). 
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Crisman, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1190 (D.N.M. 2014); United States 
v. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 n.1 (D.S.D. 2010), aff’d, 665 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2012); 2012 
SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 97, at 172 n.13. Courts have repeatedly cited The Butner Study 
Redux in coming to differing conclusions regarding the viability of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 
increasingly strict sentencing guidelines for child pornography offenses. See United States v. Johnson, 
588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (using the limitations of the study to highlight the lack of 
empirical data supporting sentencing guideline recommendations); United States v. Cunningham, 680 
F. Supp. 2d 844, 859–60 (N.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012) (considering the But-
ner Study Redux finding of a correlation between viewing child pornography and committing hands-
on offenses, as well as its finding that online child pornography “communities” stimulate hands-on 
offenses and desensitize offenders, in sentencing a defendant convicted of child pornography). Fur-
ther, while noting the study’s limitations and the need for more conclusive empirical research regard-
ing the connection between child molestation and child pornography, the Eighth Circuit has cited the 
Butner Study Redux to uphold a search warrant for child pornography solely supported by evidence of 
child molestation. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1063–64. 
 103 See Butner Study Redux, supra note 95, at 187–88. 
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jects, and built off of a smaller, unpublished study conducted by Hernandez in 
2000.104 The researchers collected their data from the participants’ official 
criminal records, the presentencing reports prepared by the participants’ proba-
tion offices, and the participants’ self-reports following treatment.105 Of the 
155 participants, 115 had no prior documented contact offenses; after consult-
ing the participants’ self-reports, however, the researchers found that only 
twenty-four of the participants denied having committed a hands-on offense.106 
By the end of the study, eighty-five percent of the 155 participants admitted to 
having committed a hands-on offense.107 Overall, the study reported that the 
vast majority of the participants admitted that they had committed child moles-
tation before getting involved with child pornography.108 
The Butner Study Redux has been met with considerable criticism regard-
ing its methodology and its overgeneralization of its results.109 Problems with 
the study include its small sample size, the fact that the study did not use a 
control group, claims that the sample size was not representative of child por-
nography and child molestation offenders, and the study’s lack of verification 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See id. at 185; Andres E. Hernandez, Self-Reported Contact Sexual Offenses by Participants in 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Sex Offender Treatment Program: Implications for Internet Sex Of-
fenders (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/Self-Reported-
Contact-Sexual-Offenses-Hernandez-et-al-2000.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8VQ-Y6R8] [hereinafter First 
Butner Study]. The First Butner Study assessed ninety voluntarily participating, self-reporting individ-
uals convicted of child pornography possession and in treatment at the residential sexual offender 
treatment program at the Butner Federal Prison. First Butner Study, supra, at 2–3. Hernandez com-
pared two categories for each participant: the “number of contact sexual crimes the subject was known 
to have committed prior to entering treatment” versus the “number of self-reported contact sexual 
crimes divulged over the course of evaluation and treatment.” Id. at 2. Of the ninety participants, sixty-
two had been convicted of either possessing child pornography or of attempting to lure a child and 
traveling across state lines to sexually abuse a child. Id. at 3. The individuals in this group reported an 
additional 1379 contact sex crimes that had never been addressed by or reported to the criminal justice 
system. Id. at 4. Further, eighty percent of the individuals who were convicted of child pornography 
possession (a group totaling fifty-five participants) reported having committed a previously unknown 
contact sexual offense, meaning that close to eighty percent of the individuals imprisoned for child 
pornography possession at the prison had committed, and gotten away with, a child molestation of-
fense. See id. at 4. 
 105 Butner Study Redux, supra note 95, at 186. 
 106 Id. at 187. In order to confirm that the participants were neither over- nor under-reporting, the 
researchers subjected fifty-two percent of the participants to polygraph tests. Id. at 186. Of the twenty-
four participants in the study who denied that they had committed a hands-on test and submitted to 
polygraph tests, “only two passed [the polygraph test].” Id. at 188. 
 107 Id. at 187. Twenty-six percent of the total study participants had known convictions for child 
molestation-related offenses, while fifty-nine percent of the participants reported that they had com-
mitted at least one previously unknown hands-on offense. See id. 
 108 Id. at 189. 
 109 See Weissler, supra note 30, at 1508–09; Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade 
and its Net-Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1707–09 (2012); Sher & Carey, supra note 
9. 
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of the self-reported incidents.110 In United States v. Johnson, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa went even further, noting that “[The 
Butner Study Redux’s] ‘whole approach’ is rejected by the treatment and scien-
tific community.”111 In response, the study’s author, Andres Hernandez, stood 
by the results of the study, but cautioned against overgeneralization; he urged 
those considering the study to be aware of its small sample size.112 Nonethe-
less, The Butner Study Redux remains the empirical study offering the most 
overwhelming evidence of the connection between child molestation and child 
pornography, and a study that courts frequently cite in their discussions of the 
subject.113 
2. Additional Studies Examining the Connection Between Child 
Molestation and Child Pornography 
A number of other social science studies have examined the connection 
between child molestation and child pornography and, compared to The Butner 
Study Redux, found a weaker, but still significant, connection between the two 
offenses.114 Seeking to understand the characteristics of child pornography of-
fenders from the perspective of law enforcement, the 2005 National Juvenile 
Online Victimization Study (“N-JOV”) surveyed 429 investigators at every 
level of law enforcement about cases involving Internet child pornography of-
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Hamilton, supra note 109, at 1705–06. In a letter to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the 
author of the study, Michael Bourke, defended the methodology, noting: “Offenders in the Butner 
program volunteered for treatment, which makes the study group a convenience sample. Such samples 
are less ideal than randomized sampling (the ‘gold standard’ in a perfect world), but by no means is 
this a flaw. In fact, convenience sampling is the most common form of sampling in the social scienc-
es.” Letter from Michael L. Bourke to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing 
Commission 16 (May 17, 2012), www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
hearings-and-meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_15_Bourke.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8NK-9KW8]. 
 111 Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 112 See Andres E. Hernandez, Psychological and Behavioral Characteristics of Child Pornography 
Offenders in Treatment 9 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished position paper) (on file with author). 
 113 See supra note 102 (collecting cases that discuss the Butner Study Redux). 
 114 See, e.g., WOLAK I, supra note 95, at viii; 2012 SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 97, at 170–
206. In 2012, the U.S. Sentencing Commission published a report that provided a thorough analysis of 
the empirical data regarding the connection between child molestation and child pornography. 2012 
SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 97, at 170–206. Although noting that The Butner Study Redux offered 
the strongest published evidence of said connection, the Sentencing Report detailed other studies con-
ducted in the United States and abroad. See id. at 172 n.13 (citing, e.g., Richard Wollert et al., Federal 
Internet Child Pornography Offenders—Limited Offense Histories and Low Recidivism Rates, in 7 THE 
SEX OFFENDER: CURRENT TRENDS IN POLICY & TREATMENT PRACTICE (Barbara K. Schwartz ed., 2012) 
(based on a study of seventy-two federal child pornography offenders in the United States who were 
treated by the authors during the past decade; the authors found that twenty offenders, or twenty-eight 
percent, had prior convictions for a contact or non-contact sexual offense, including a prior child pornog-
raphy offense); Endrass, supra note 101, at 3, 4 (study of 231 Swiss child pornography offenders finding 
that only 1% had prior convictions for “hands-on” sex offenses and an additional 3.5% had prior convic-
tions for possession of child pornography). 
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fenses.115 The study found that fifty-five percent of the cases in which child 
pornography was either investigated or eventually discovered involved a “dual 
offender,” defined in the study as those child pornography offenders who pos-
sessed child pornography and sexually victimized or attempted to sexually vic-
timize children.116 In forty percent of the cases, evidence of child molestation 
and child pornography possession were both discovered during the course of 
the investigation; the other fifteen percent of the cases involved dual offenders 
who had attempted to sexually victimize children by soliciting undercover in-
vestigators who posed online as minors.117 Further, fifty-five percent of the 
cases in which investigators uncovered a dual offender began as allegations of 
child sexual victimization.118 
Another study conducted a meta-analysis of twenty-four different studies 
from around the world that had examined the connection between individuals 
convicted of child pornography possession and those that had been convicted 
of child molestation.119 Eighteen of these studies solely looked at official da-
ta—for example, convictions or arrest records—and, in the aggregate, found 
that only 12.2% of subjects who had been convicted of child pornography pos-
session had also been convicted of or arrested for a child molestation-related 
offense.120 The other six studies derived data from self-reporting convicted 
child molesters and in the aggregate found that 55% of individuals convicted 
of child pornography possession had also committed child molestation.121 Ac-
cordingly, the meta-analysis concluded that neither number likely encompasses 
the true nature of the connection between child pornography and child moles-
tation, but noted with certainty that a large number of sex offenses are never 
discovered.122 Still, the authors of the study advised courts and law enforce-
ment officials to take into consideration the risk of the connection between 
child pornography and child molestation.123 
B. Judicial and Congressional Treatment of Child Molestation  
and Child Pornography 
Further informing courts’ decisions regarding whether evidence of child 
molestation is sufficient to provide probable cause to search for evidence of 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See WOLAK I, supra note 95, at xi. 
 116 See id. at viii, 16. 
 117 See id. at 16. 
 118 See id. at 16–17. 
 119 See Seto, supra note 97, at 128–30, tbl.1 (summarizing the studies that the meta-analysis ex-
amined). 
 120 See id. at 128–30, 132. 
 121 See id. at 128–30, 133. 
 122 See id. at 139–40. 
 123 See id. at 140. 
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child pornography are the policy concerns reflected by the judicial and legisla-
tive treatment of sexual offenses against children, as numerous judicial and 
legislative sources recognize a connection between child molestation and child 
pornography.124 In cases unrelated to the probable cause inquiry, various courts 
have supported a connection between child molestation and child pornogra-
phy.125 Some state statutes criminalizing the possession of child pornography 
have conflated child pornography and sexual abuse.126 Further, the federal leg-
islature has shown a disdain for child pornography-related offenses, especially 
through the imposition of severe prison sentences.127 
The persistent increase in federal and state sentencing guidelines related 
to child pornography puts pressure on the courts to endorse search warrants to 
search for child pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation 
because of the persuasive effect of federal sentencing guidelines as well as the 
inferred public support that the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 871 n.67; M. Jackson Jones, A Confusing Interaction Between 
the Warrants Clause, Child Pornography, and Child Molestation: Determining Whether Evidence of 
Child Molestation Creates Probable Cause to Search for Child Pornography, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 75, 118–21 (2014). 
 125 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“The distribution of photographs and 
films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children 
. . . .”); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996)) (concluding that “possession of child pornography . . . shares a con-
nection . . . with pedophilia” and citing a congressional finding that “child pornography is often used 
by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a 
model for sexual acting out with children”); United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-358, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12–13 (1996)) (“Law enforcement 
investigations have verified that pedophiles almost always collect child pornography or child eroti-
ca.”); United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[C]ommon sense would indicate 
that a person who is sexually interested in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to 
order and receive child pornography.”). 
 126 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 866. Hessick compiles an array of examples of state laws that 
conflate the two offenses. Id. at 866 n.43 (citing, for example, HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-752 (2007) 
(categorizing possession on child pornography as “promoting child abuse in the third degree”); MONT. 
CODE. ANN. § 45-5-625(1)(e) (2009) (classifying the possession of child pornography as “sexual 
abuse of children”); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.686, 163.687 (2003) (classifying possession of child por-
nography as “encouraging child abuse”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d) (2010) (classifying the pos-
session of child pornography under “sexual abuse of children”)). 
 127 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 863–64; 2012 SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 97, at 10–15. 
An example of the federal legislature’s palpable opposition to sexual offenses against children can be 
easily inferred from the passing of a 1991 amendment to the existing child pornography sentencing 
guidelines, the Helms-Thurmond Amendment, that purported to “attempt to assure severe punishment 
for dealing in child pornography.” 137 Cong. Rec. S10323 (July 18, 1991). The amendment passed 
the Senate by a vote of 99–0. See WILLIAM K. SESSIONS ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE 
HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 20 (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/sex-offenses/20091030_History_
Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8VQ-Y6R8] [hereinafter GUIDELINES HISTORY]. 
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Commission”), as a product of legislative action, enjoys.128 With the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984, Congress tasked the Sentencing Commission with 
creating sentencing guidelines that fit the basic sentencing objectives estab-
lished by Congress in order to provide more determinate and uniform prison 
sentences.129 The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the federal sentencing 
guidelines as persuasive authority that, as “the product of a careful study based 
on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of indi-
vidual sentencing decisions,” should inform most sentencing decisions.130 The 
guidelines are also directed by the substantive and procedural requirements of 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7) (2012) (providing a statutory maximum of fifteen years for 
knowingly producing, intending to distribute, or knowingly distributing “child pornography that is an 
adapted or modified depiction of an identifiable minor”); Crisman, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1206–18 
(detailing historical and significant recent increases in sentencing for crimes related to child pornogra-
phy). Courts are not bound by the sentencing guidelines and many judges have pushed back against 
them. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Stern, 590 F. 
Supp. 2d 945, 960 (N.D. Ohio 2008); see also United States v. Nghiem, 432 Fed. Appx. 753, 757 
(10th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the sentencing guidelines despite expressing concern regarding their 
increasingly strict nature). But see United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 862–63 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010), aff’d, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012) (praising the Sentencing Commission for using empir-
ical data and its own expertise to craft appropriate guidelines). The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio advocated against the guidelines related to child pornography because they “do not re-
flect the kind of empirical data, national experience, and independent expertise that are characteristic 
of the Commission’s institutional role.” Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (quoting United States v. Onti-
veros, No. 07-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *8 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2008). In United States v. 
Dorvee, the Second Circuit further excoriated the federal sentencing guidelines related to child pornog-
raphy, arguing that the Sentencing Commission abandoned its usual calculated approach for establish-
ing sentencing guidelines that involves careful study of empirical data. 616 F.3d at 184. The Dorvee 
court added that the sentencing guidelines for child pornography are “fundamentally different from 
most and that, unless applied with great care, can lead to unreasonable sentences,” and encouraged 
district judges “to take seriously the broad discretion they possess in fashioning sentences . . . bearing 
in mind that they are dealing with an eccentric Guideline of highly unusual provenance which, unless 
carefully applied, can easily generate unreasonable results.” Id. at 184, 188. 
 129 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Chapter II, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (highlight-
ing the purposes of the Sentencing Commission, including to “provide certainty and fairness” in sen-
tencing, to “avoi[d] unwarranted sentencing disparities,” “maintai[n] sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account 
in the establishment of general sentencing practices,” and to “reflect, to the extent practicable, [sen-
tencing-relevant] advancement in [the] knowledge of human behavior”); Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 349–50 (2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) (noting that Congress required the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission to consider the following sentencing objectives in promulgating the sentencing 
guidelines: “(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic 
aims of sentencing, namely, (a) just punishment (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) 
rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the sentencing guidelines; (5) Sentencing Com-
mission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitu-
tion”). 
 130 Gail, 552 U.S. at 46; see Rita, 551 U.S. at 349–50. 
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congressional sentencing legislation.131 The U.S. Sentencing Commission adds 
that the sentencing guidelines are the product of a wide array of other factors 
in addition to those mandated by Congress, including “the public concern gen-
erated by the offense.”132 The Sentencing Commission promulgated the first 
sentencing guidelines regarding child pornography-related crimes in 1987.133 
In her examination of the modern legislative response to the increase of 
child pornography, Carissa Byrne Hessick outlines the spike since 1990 in the 
level of punishment recommended by the sentencing guidelines for possession 
of child pornography.134 Since 1990, the federal maximum penalty for posses-
sion of child pornography rose from ten years of imprisonment to twenty 
years, while a mandatory minimum five-year sentence was also added in 
2003.135 The penalties for possession of child pornography have also drastical-
ly climbed at the state level, as thirty states have increased the penalties possi-
ble for possession of child pornography since each state initially criminalized 
child pornography possession.136 
III. THE COMMON SENSE AND “INTUITIVE” RELATIONSHIP: PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF CHILD MOLESTATION PROVIDES PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Given the common-sense, non-technical, and elastic nature of the proba-
ble cause standard, the sufficient empirical support for a connection between 
child molestation and child pornography, and the policy concerns related to 
child molestation and child pornography, probable cause to search for evidence 
of child molestation should provide probable cause to search for evidence of 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See GUIDELINES HISTORY, supra note 127, at 1 (citing, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98–473, Chapter II, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 and 28 U.S.C.)). 
 132 See id. Other factors include, “[t]he public concern generated by the offense . . . and the current 
incidence of the offense in the community and in the Nation as a whole.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) 
(2012)). 
 133 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2G2.1, 2G2.2 (1987); see GUIDELINES HISTORY, 
supra note 127, at 10. 
 134 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 855–64. But see GELBER, supra note 12, at 15 (defending re-
cent increases in sentences for child pornography-related offenses). Professor Hessick calls the legis-
lative response to the modern increase in child pornography “uniformly draconian.” Hessick, supra 
note 41, at 855–64. 
 135 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 857. 
 136 See id. at 857–59. Hessick details the various increases of each state at length and notes the 
most extreme increases: Georgia reclassified possession of child pornography from a misdemeanor to 
a felony, increasing the prison sentence from a maximum of twelve months to a minimum of five 
years with a maximum of twenty years in prison; Montana increased the maximum from six months to 
ten years imprisonment, and Nevada increased the maximum penalty for repeat offenses of child por-
nography possession from ten years to life imprisonment. See id. at 860. 
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child pornography.137 The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case in-
volving the question and find that probable cause for child molestation is suffi-
cient to establish probable cause for child pornography.138 In the absence of a 
Supreme Court finding, courts should rule in accordance with the Eighth Cir-
cuit and find that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation 
provides probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography.139 Alter-
natively, courts that choose an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the proba-
ble cause standard that precludes such a probable cause finding should none-
theless admit evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that is based solely 
on the nexus between child molestation and child pornography because such 
evidence would be seized “in objectively reasonable reliance on” a warrant 
and, therefore, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.140 
A. Granting Certiorari to Establish that Probable Cause to Support a 
Search Warrant for Child Molestation is Sufficient to Support a  
Search Warrant for Child Pornography 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case involving the ques-
tion of whether probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation pro-
vides probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography.141 The con-
troversy is not only “compelling,”142 but also falls squarely within two of the 
reasons for which the Court generally grants certiorari: (1) “[A] United States 
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another 
United States court of appeals on the same important matter;”143 and (2) “[A] 
United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law 
that has not been, but should be, settled by [the Supreme Court].”144 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
 138 See SUP. CT. R. 10; Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79. 
 139 See Colbert, 605 F.3d at 579. 
 140 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); United States v. Needham, 718 F.3d 1190, 
1195–96 (9th Cir. 2013); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 579. 
 141 See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 142 See id. (noting that the Supreme Court only grants a petition for certiorari for “compelling 
reasons”). 
 143 SUP. CT. R. 10(a); compare United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation does not provide probable cause to 
search for child pornography), and Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 422 (3d Cir. 2011) (coming 
to the same conclusion as Doyle), and United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(coming to the same conclusion as Doyle), and U.S. v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(coming to the same conclusion as Doyle), with Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79 (holding that probable 
cause to search for evidence of child molestation does provide probable cause to search for child por-
nography). 
 144 SUP. CT. R. 10(c); see Colbert v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011) (denying certiorari for 
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573); Falso v. United States, 558 U.S. 933 (2009) (denying certiorari for Falso, 544 
F.3d 110); John, 654 F.3d at 419–22 (inferring that the Supreme Court has not examined the issue of 
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By failing to grant certiorari in the two cases that involved this specific 
question, the Supreme Court has left open the controversy, thus allowing con-
tinued conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeal and fostering conflicting 
interpretations of the probable cause standard.145 For example, in denying cer-
tiorari in United States v. Falso, the Supreme Court passed on the opportunity 
to provide guidance to lower courts regarding whether an individual’s criminal 
record that includes a conviction for child molestation is “highly relevant” to a 
probable cause determination for a search warrant to search that individual’s 
home for evidence of child pornography.146 Similarly, in denying certiorari in 
United States v. Colbert, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether an 
issuing court may properly grant a search warrant to search for evidence of 
child pornography based solely on the inference that individuals who are sex-
ually interested in children probably possess child pornography.147 Granting 
certiorari to resolve these issues would not only lead to unanimity among the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal on an important issue, but also resolve an unclear ar-
ea of interpretation of the probable cause standard.148 
B. A Proper Application of the Fluid, Non-Technical Probable  
Cause Standard 
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari or a lower court is forced to address 
this issue, the court should find that probable cause that can support a search 
warrant for child molestation should be sufficient to support a search warrant 
for child pornography.149 In Gates, the Supreme Court offered a concise sum-
mary of the flexibility and perspective of the probable cause standard: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabili-
ties. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, 
practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the 
same—and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
                                                                                                                           
whether probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provides probable cause to search 
for evidence of child pornography by examining only other Circuit Courts of Appeal decisions that 
have analyzed the issue). 
 145 See Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011); Falso, 544 F.3d at 112–13, 
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 933 (2009); Doyle, 650 F.3d at 472. 
 146 See Falso, 558 U.S. 933; Brief for Appellee at 25, Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (No. 06-2721-cr), 2006 
WL 6272568. 
 147 See Colbert, 131 S. Ct. 1469; Brief for Appellee at 22–24, Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (No. 08-
3243), 2009 WL 129651. 
 148 See Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463; Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
 149 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 231; Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
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analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field 
of law enforcement.150 
The solution to the question that has divided a number of the Circuit Courts of 
Appeal is readily available based on the elastic and multi-faceted probable 
cause standard that the Supreme Court has created: both issuing magistrate 
courts and appellate courts should conclude that a warrant to search for child 
pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation is supported by 
probable cause because such a finding would fall well within the carefully 
crafted boundaries of the probable cause standard.151 
The Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, as 
was established in Colbert, which noted that a sufficient nexus exists between 
child molestation and child pornography possession to support a finding of 
probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography based solely on 
evidence of child molestation.152 The Eighth Circuit noted that finding other-
wise “seems to be in tension both with common experience and a fluid, non-
technical conception of probable cause.”153 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that the probable cause standard is one that is “not readily, or even useful-
ly, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”154 Rather, the “practical, nontechnical 
conception” of the standard requires reason and common sense.155 A finding of 
probable cause does not even need to be more likely true than false, nor cor-
rect; as long as the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant sets 
forth facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference of criminal activity, 
the search warrant is supported by probable cause.156 
When conducting a probable cause inquiry in these cases, precedent in the 
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeal mandates that justices consider 
not only their own experience and common sense, but also the experiences and 
opinions of the law enforcement officials who provide sworn support to search 
warrant applications.157 Although the opinion and experience evidence that law 
                                                                                                                           
 150 462 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 151 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 231–32; Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
 152 See Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79. 
 153 Id. at 578; see also Hessick, supra note 41, at 871 n.67 (providing examples of government 
actors who have expressed a concern that child pornography possessors present a higher risk of sex-
ually abusing a child). 
 154 Maryland. v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232); see 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 155 Gates, 462 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). 
 156 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990) (stating that the factual determinations on 
which the probable cause inquiry is based need not be correct, just reasonable); Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). 
 157 See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 214, 231; United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (in weighing evidence supporting a request for a search warrant, a magistrate may rely on 
the opinions of law enforcement officers); United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2000) 
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enforcement officials submit forms only part of the evidence that a court can 
rely on to find that a search warrant is supported by probable cause, and alt-
hough courts should weigh that the “officer [is] engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime” before crediting any of the officer’s 
sworn opinions,158 cases illustrating the nexus between child molestation and 
child pornography feature repeated and consistent evidence from law enforce-
ment officials supporting this nexus.159 Officers regularly swear in the affida-
vits submitted in support of search warrants that—based on police experience 
and training—they believe individuals who have committed crimes related to 
child molestation also regularly possess child pornography.160  
Further, given the particular societal disdain for crimes against children 
that is apparent in the language of judicial decisions, legislation, and the con-
gressional record, judges should heavily weigh the “valid public interest” in 
policing the issue of child pornography when determining whether probable 
cause exists.161 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court concluded that states 
are entitled to greater leeway under the U.S. Constitution to criminalize child 
pornography in part because “safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor” outweighed the detriment of impinging on the constitu-
                                                                                                                           
(in weighing evidence supporting a request for a search warrant, a magistrate may “give considerable 
weight to the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers” (citation omitted)). 
 158 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 159 See, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that an affi-
davit in support of a search warrant included an officer’s opinion evidence that, based on the officer’s 
experience and training, a nexus exists between child pornography and child molestation); Falso, 544 
F.3d at 113 (noting that an affidavit in support of a search warrant included the opinion of the FBI’s 
Behavioral Analysis Unit that “[t]he majority of individuals who collect child pornography are per-
sons who have a sexual attraction to children”). 
 160 See, e.g., Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896 (an affidavit included an officer swearing that “based 
upon [his] training and experience . . . [he] know[s] subjects involved in this type of criminal behavior 
have in their possession child pornography”); Falso, 544 F.3d at 113 (an affidavit included infor-
mation gathered by a member of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit that included the observation that 
“‘[t]he majority of individuals who collect child pornography are persons who have a sexual attraction 
to children,’ and that those who collect images of child pornography generally store their collections 
at home”); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198, 198 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing FBI congres-
sional testimony that “noted ‘a strong correlation between child pornography offenders and molesters 
of children,’ and that ‘the correlation between collection of child pornography and actual child abuse 
is too real and too grave to ignore,’” in holding that, because a direct connection exists between child 
pornography and pedophilia, evidence regarding child pornography was admissible). 
 161 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (concluding that, in 
traditional criminal law, probable cause is not necessary to validate an administrative search, the court 
strongly considered whether “a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated” by the war-
rant); see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109, 110 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
57 (1982); Protection of Children From Computer Pornography Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 892 Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 41 (June 4, 1996) (statement of Dee Jepsen, Presi-
dent, “Enough is Enough!”). 
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tionally protected right of free speech.162 The Court bluntly concluded that 
“[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a 
government objective of surpassing importance.”163 Lower courts and legisla-
tive bodies share this contempt for crimes against children, as evidenced by 
both language in case law and legislative intent.164 In addition, the consistent 
increase since 1987 in punishment for crimes related to child pornography un-
der the state and federal sentencing guidelines reinforces, at the legislative lev-
el, the strong, persistent public sentiment against child pornography.165 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has noted that “a valid public interest” can inform a 
court’s decision to endorse a search warrant, the particular public interest in 
curbing child pornography-related crimes should inform a court’s decision to 
endorse search warrants to search for child pornography based solely on evi-
dence of child molestation.166 
The flexibility of the probable cause standard and the factors that contrib-
ute to the probable cause inquiry permit courts to conclude that a sufficient 
nexus exists between child molestation and child pornography to conclude that 
probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provides probable 
cause to search for child pornography.167 Such a nexus has been supported by 
judges applying an elastic and practical probable cause standard in a wide ar-
ray of jurisdictions, by experienced law enforcement officials, and by schol-
ars.168 Rather than being “objectively unreasonable,”169 the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                           
 162 458 U.S. at 756–57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
But see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239, 256 (2002) (holding that virtual child 
pornography is protected by the First Amendment). 
 163 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. 
 164 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(a) (2014) (suggesting repulsion at such crimes by includ-
ing the word “immoral” to describe the crime of child molestation); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 
1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that “a serious crime against a child is an offense . . . to society”); 
154 CONG. REC. H10250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Barton) (describing congres-
sional investigation of child pornography as “shocking,” and noting that children who are harmed as a 
result of child pornography “suffer unspeakable pain and suffering”). 
 165 See Hessick, supra note 41, at 866 (detailing the spike in severity of child pornography pun-
ishments under the sentencing guidelines at the state and federal level since 1987); 2012 SENTENCING 
REPORT, supra note 97, at 10–15 (detailing the evolution of the child pornography sentencing guide-
lines at the federal level). 
 166 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
 167 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
 168 See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (commenting that “evidence suggests that pedophiles use 
child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79 (finding 
a sufficient nexus between child molestation and child pornography to uphold a warrant to search for 
child pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation); Falso, 544 F.3d at 131 (Livingston, 
J., concurring) (quoting Brand, 467 F.3d at 198) (noting that “possession of child pornography . . . 
shares a connection . . . with pedophilia,” and endorsing Congress’s finding that “child pornography is 
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967 (6th Cir. 2006) (crediting an affidavit from an FBI agent that details the FBI’s “institutional 
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probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provides probable 
cause to search for child pornography is arguably common sense, and at least 
fits within the “fluid, non-technical” probable cause standard.170 
C. Alternative Solutions: The Good Faith Exception and Law  
Enforcement Responsibility 
Notwithstanding a holding by an appellate court that a search warrant to 
search for child pornography that is based solely on evidence of child molesta-
tion is invalid, the evidence seized as a result of such a warrant should still be 
admissible in court proceedings against the defendant because the process by 
which law enforcement seized the evidence easily falls within the good faith 
exception.171 The good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment mandates that 
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that is later found to be invalid should 
nonetheless not be subject to the exclusionary rule as long as a law enforce-
ment official’s reliance on the warrant is “objectively reasonable.”172 An of-
                                                                                                                           
knowledge” that individuals who have committed child molestation “devote time, money, and energy 
to the pursuit of child pornography . . . and that they have well-developed techniques for gaining ac-
cess to child pornography”); United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation 
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 169 Doyle, 650 F.3d at 470, 476. 
 170 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 231. In her law review article, Kathryn A. 
Rigler examines analogous situations of a broad, elastic view of the probable cause standard. Child 
Pornography and Child Molestation: One and the Same or Separate Crimes?, 9 SETON HALL CIR-
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to their crimes in their homes. See id. (citing United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 
1992); States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 171 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577–78 (noting 
that the decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeal that conclude that search warrants to search for evidence 
of child pornography based solely on evidence of child molestation are not supported by probable 
cause are “in tension . . . with . . . a fluid, non-technical conception of probable cause”) (citing Falso, 
544 F.3d at 114; Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287). 
 172 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. In addition to situations in which the search warrant application is so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has noted three other circumstances in which the good-faith exception does not apply: (1) where 
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See id. at 923. 
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ficer may reasonably rely on a warrant when the evidence supporting probable 
cause in the search warrant application is sufficient to “create disagreement 
among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable 
cause.”173 Given that, in cases dependent on whether probable cause to search 
for evidence of child molestation provides probable cause to search for child 
pornography, “thoughtful and competent” judges have come to opposite con-
clusions, the good faith exception should apply.174 
Another potential solution to the disagreement among the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal regarding the appropriate probable cause standard is to require law 
enforcement officials who investigate individuals suspected of committing 
criminal acts involving children to more carefully and thoroughly draft their 
search warrants.175 In Virgin Islands v. John, the Third Circuit overturned a 
warrant to search for child pornography based solely on evidence of child mo-
lestation in part because the language of the warrant did not explicitly connect 
the defendant’s child molestation offenses to potential evidence of child por-
nography.176 Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States v. Falso admon-
ished the law enforcement officials who submitted the warrant to search for 
child pornography for not further investigating the link between the defend-
ant’s criminal history of child molestation and suspected evidence of child 
pornography in the defendant’s home.177 Further, the Sixth Circuit suggested 
that including in search warrant applications expert analysis about whether 
individuals who engage in child molestation are also likely to possess child 
pornography would help to persuade the courts that such a nexus exists, and 
therefore the search warrant would be supported by probable cause.178 If law 
enforcement officials submit more thorough search warrant applications, a Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals may be more amenable to finding a sufficient link be-
tween child pornography and child molestation to support concluding that the 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. at 926. 
 174 Id. Compare Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79 (holding that probable cause to search for evidence 
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search warrant is supported by probable cause, or at least finding that the evi-
dence fits under the good faith exception.179 
CONCLUSION 
Child pornography is, unfortunately, an ever-increasing scourge to society 
that causes irrevocable harm to thousands of children around the world. The 
Supreme Court should, in order to provide guidance for the rest of the country, 
grant certiorari to a case that includes the question of whether probable cause 
to search for evidence of child pornography exists based solely on evidence of 
child molestation. Without Supreme Court guidance, the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal and lower courts have reached differing conclusions with regard to the 
applicable probable cause standard, and law enforcement officials face uncer-
tainty regarding whether their actions fully comply with the law. Courts are in 
a position to contain the incidence and spread of child pornography by provid-
ing law enforcement officers with a better opportunity to investigate offenders. 
Ample support exists in the scientific, law enforcement, and legal communities 
for courts to act and justly defend the most vulnerable members of our society. 
Courts can and should find that probable cause to search for evidence of child 
molestation provides probable cause to search for evidence of child pornogra-
phy. Given the flexible, non-technical, and common sense nature of the proba-
ble cause standard, courts would not even have to step beyond the carefully 
crafted boundaries of their power to crack down on incidences of child pornog-
raphy. In the absence of finding probable cause to support such search war-
rants, courts should nonetheless admit evidence recovered subject to these 
search warrants via the good faith exception. 
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